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 Abstract: African countries may have fared poorly compared to some countries in other regions,
but relative to their own performance history some African countries have done quite well over
the past eight years. In particular 2004 and 2005 were especially good years. How can such
performance be made to stick and even expand? The answer to that question requires better
understanding of the source of good performance. This paper proceeds on the assumption that
technology was, at least partially, responsible. The result shows that a feeble technology
undercuts per capita real GDP across African countries. However, the impacts of new
technologies, measured by the intensities of internet and cell phone use are very strong. The
policy implication of the findings speaks to the need for investment in new technologies for which
productivity is high and the adoption and diffusion costs seem low. Further research can clarify
the findings and policy by expanding and improving the data coverage, and examining effects on
income of different kinds of technologies.
Keywords: technology and per capita income, GDP per capita Africa, African countries’ GDP-
technology nexus
JEL Code: O15, C21, O55, C51, O47, O41
______________________________________________________________________________
2Intensity of technology use and per capita real GDP across some African countries
______________________________________________________________________________
 Abstract: African countries may have fared poorly compared to some countries in other regions,
but relative to their own performance history some African countries have done quite well over the
past eight years. In particular 2004 and 2005 were especially good years. How can such
performance be made to stick and even expand? The answer to that question requires better
understanding of the source of good performance. This paper proceeds on the assumption that
technology was, at least partially, responsible. The result shows that a feeble technology undercuts
per capita real GDP across African countries. However, the impacts of new technologies,
measured by the intensities of internet and cell phone use are very strong. The policy implication of
the findings speaks to the need for investment in new technologies for which productivity is high
and the adoption and diffusion costs seem low. Further research can clarify the findings and policy
by expanding and improving the data coverage, and examining effects on income of different kinds
of technologies.
Keywords: technology and per capita income, GDP per capita Africa, African countries’ GDP-
technology nexus
JEL Code: O15, C21, O55, C51, O47, O41
______________________________________________________________________________
 1. Introduction
African countries suffer from Africa-itis. Africa-itis is a stigma that preceded and will most
likely outlast HIV/AIDS. On one hand the stigma  makes it hard for observers to notice good
3economic performance of African countries, and on the other it makes it obsessively easy to point
out the bad news. It is not only that “Africa surely suffers from a remarkable inattention of the
international scientific community” as David Bloom and Jeffrey Sachs (1998, p. 37) point out, it is
also that the little attention African countries receive is inordinately normative and pessimistic.
Rarely do even of the best of expert writings on African countries, for example, reveal that
although over the 1960-1990 decades African countries made up a large percentage of the “growth
disasters”, some African countries did make the list of the “growth miracles” (see Temple, 1999,
Table 2, p. 116).  African countries may have missed surfing early on the bubbly wave of the
dotcom years, however, during the late 1990s up to 39% of African countries did catch at least the
backdraft of the wave. Indeed, many African economies grew at rates no lower than two percent
per annum, and strong growth continued through 1998. As the dotcom wave subsided, growth
slowed to 3.2% in 2002, before climbing back up to 4.3% in 2003, 4.6% in 2004, and higher still
in 2005 (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa - UNECA, 2005). In sum: over the past
eight years to date African countries have grown at annual rates exceeding four percent (OECD
Observer, 2005). Moreover, by 2004 there were only three truly troubleshoots in Africa (the
Darfur region of the Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Cote d’Ivoire). Yet, the whole of Africa is more
likely to be defined by these three spots than Asia is likely to be characterized by Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, North Korea - all truly red hot spots.
The bias in economic reporting on African countries is systematic as it is inexplicable. Table
1 indicates that the African continent itself is competitive in the marketplace of attitudes. Using the
Google Search facility one finds that for every “Africa bad continent” hit there are three and a half
hits for “Africa good continent”. This ranks Africa as the must positively perceived continent.
4However, Africa’s  the ratio of good-to-poor economic performance is only 1.39, placing the
continent at the bottom - the Africa-itis. *PUT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE**
Even against such background, research is still unable to hide that “Africa” average
performance figures mask diverse performance across regions and countries, see, e.g.,  UNECA
(2005) and IMF (2005) . Botswana has been one of the best performers in the world for nearly
four decades. Central Africa has grown at an annual average rate of more than 14% during the
2004-2005 year as Figure 1 shows.1  The differences in performance should not be surprising as
standard economics teaches that the production possibilities of any economy depend on its
technical capability. Technical capability is defined by the quantity and quality of available
resources and the level of technology. Economic growth is the expansion of production
possibilities resulting from improved technical capability, and subject to the initial and current
institutional conditions, and the policies that govern both. Because capabilities differ across
economies so too does economic performance. Yet, too often analyses of the sources of the
economic performance of African countries focus either on external factors for which subsequent
policy is exogenous, or on some loose generalizations of internal sources of growth for which
useful policy is nearly impossible to conduct. For instance, the UNECA study lists “macro-
stability” and “tourism” as the main internal sources of growth for Africa in 2004, but then the
report goes on to lament the weak domestic investment, low domestic savings, and the risk of
currency appreciation as “some areas of concern”. Research must do better than this if it is to serve
a credible policy function.
*PUT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE*
While the quality of resources, such as human capital, which individual African countries
5have is a matter of considerable debate, quantitatively most African countries are no more resource
poor than their counterparts in other regions of the world. For the most part African countries had
colonial experiences not unlike those of other developing countries, suggesting congruent initial
conditions across some world regions. Additionally,  many developing countries around the world
pursued similar economic and political policies immediately post-independence. The movements
toward resource nationalization and import substitution policies were not unique to African
countries. This all seems to imply that observed economic growth rate differences are not
principally due to resources, initial conditions, or policy.  A reasonable constraint on the economic
growth of African countries has been the fact that technological change has never “etherealised”
progressively and adequately.2  For example, a quick glance at the sources of economic growth of
the USA would show a clear shift from reliance for growth on resources (Romer’s objects) in the
early years to ideas in the middle years, and increasingly to healthy interactions and intra-actions of
ideas and objects in more recent times (Denison, 1967, Gordon, 2002, Aghion, 2006). Since 
nothing of the sort has been documented for African countries, it seems reasonable to pose as a
hypothesis that a major obstacle to the economic performance of African countries is a feeble
technological foundation. Just as even the craftiest of construction engineers cannot erect a
skyscraper on Jell-O, so too strong and sustained growth needs a strong technological
infrastructure. 
The objective of this paper is to quantify some of the technological foundations of
economic performance in 2004/5 across the 46 African countries listed in the appendix to this
paper. The objective is important because technology improves the productivity of other resources.
It is especially crucial where the relative productivity of other factors of production is a matter of
6considerable concern. As Aaron Segal (1985) points out “of all gaps that separate Africa from the
rest of the world the science and technology is probably the most critical, and the most profound “
(p. 110, italics added). Section 2 outlines the theory behind the paper. Section 3 turns to practical
issues including data, estimations, and results. The final section makes concluding remarks.
2. Theory
This section first sketches the relevant literature and then states a simple and practical
model.
2.1. Literature
Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning (1999) review a very large set of literature on African
performance seeking to uncover commonalities of the sources of economic performance. They
relate sources of the economic decline of Africa to the lack of social capital, trade openness, public
services, financial depth, presence of a  risky geography, and over-dependence on foreign aid.
What stands out from this literature review at the aggregate is the negative effect on performance
of the so-called “Africa dummy”. Consistent with Collier and Gunning many other researchers
report a significant African dummy ranging in size from -0.54 to -0.0052 over the 1960-1989
decades (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, Alcala and Ciccone, 2001, Barro, 1991, Easterly and
Levine, 1997). Also during the 1960-2003 years Africa’s total factor productivity (TFP) has
remained low between -1.34 and -0.05 according to some estimates ( Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999,
Soderbom and Teal, 2003, Jorgenson and Vu, 2005).3 The negative effects of Africa’s TFP and
dummy are discernible despite the fact that other sources of growth, such as physical capital per
worker or human capital per worker, are not that different from those of other regions.4
Temple (1999) looks at the new growth evidence from the perspectives of the old
7(exogenous) neoclassical and new (endogenous) growth theories. The evidence concludes that
differences in economic growth are mainly due to differences in capital investment in equipment,
people, and R & D; high inequality of income and the implication of that for (in-)stability;
economic freedom and security of property rights; government and its effect with respect to
taxation, spending, regulation, and the financing of infrastructure; and openness to trade.
However, Temple’s “new evidence” is not really new; W. Arthur Lewis (1965) argues that
“the proximate causes of economic growth are the effort to economize, the accumulation of
knowledge, and the accumulation of capital” (p.164). These causes have strong basis in the
quantity and quality of human population and other natural resources, and in government and
government policy. It is not surprising that Temple and Johnson (1998) in associating economic
growth to social capability, start where Lewis was, or at least where he wanted to go. Here is one
important sign Lewis posted:
Economic growth depends both upon technological knowledge about things and living creatures, and upon
social knowledge about man and his relations with his fellowmen. The former is often emphasized in this
context, but the latter is just as important since growth depends as much upon such matters as learning how
to administer large scale organizations, or creating institutions which favour economizing effort, as it does
upon breeding new seeds or learning how to build bigger dams (p.164).
The interesting part of this thoughtful line of work is how seemingly non-economic factors
affect the relationship between economic growth and technology (cf. Hoselitz, 1952, Fafchamps,
2000). In a recent paper Bart Los and Bart Verspagen (2001) “distinguish four ways in which
technology and innovation have their impact on growth” (p. 2). The first channel treats technology
either as a pure public good and in that case its rate of change is exogenous, or as a quasi-public
8good, the rate of which is endogenous. In both cases technology drives the steady state rate of
growth. In turn technology is a function of factor ratios so that in the exogenous version as the
capital-labour ratio increases, the rate of technical change first rises and then falls as diminishing
returns to scale set in (Solow, 1957, Swan, 1956). In the endogenous version factor ratios such as
the human capital-labour ratio are dynamic with the potential for postponing diminishing marginal
products and sustaining convergent/divergent (steady) states (Romer, 1989, 1990, Lucas, 1988,
1993).  Bennett McCallum (1996) and Mark Rogers (2003) provide excellent reviews of
neoclassical exogenous and endogenous growth theories, while Nazrul Islam (2004) assesses the
normative (policy) value of endogenous growth theories to developing countries.
A second channel which Los and Verspagen point out is technological diffusion which
enables lagging economies to catch-up with frontrunners. However, the rate at which economies
close the technological gap between them is a function of “social capability” and “technological
congruence” (see Los and Verspagen, 2001). Social capability is the basis for technological
“absorptive capability” (Kneller and Stevens, 2006), and it has two interactive dimensions: the
infrastructural base of which fixed capital such roads, railways, and so on are a major part, and the
superstructural base including institutions, social capital, and the like. Congruence implies
applicability of technology developed elsewhere.
As third and fourth ways in which technology and innovations enter economic growth Los
and Verspagen point to learning-by-doing and roundabout production. Combined these two
channels permit a demand-driven cumulative impact of technology on economic performance,
variously called the Verdoorn-Young-Arrow learning effect, or the Myrdal-Kaldor secular and
causal effect (Young, 1928, Arrow, 1962, Kaldor, 1966, Thirlwall, 1978). 
9Measures of technological capability differ and rank countries differently as Daniele
Archibugi and Alberto Coco (2005) describe (cf. Jeffrey Jones, 2006). What is disturbing,
however, is that African countries invariably rank low on all key indices of technology. The
Technology Achievement Index (TAI), inspired by the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP)
and outlined in Desai, Fukuda-Parr, Johnson, and Sagasti (2002) focuses on 72 countries, dividing
them into groups: “leaders”, “dynamic adopters”, “marginalised”, and “others’. This index has four
dimensions (technology creation, diffusion of new technologies, diffusion of old technologies, and
technology relevant human skills). A few African countries on the list score low. Besides on the
TAI, African countries are also not doing well on the Technology Index (Technologyi in this
paper)  assembled by the World Economic Forum. This paper seeks to understand the effects of
technology on per capita real GDP across 46 African countries in 2004/2005. Such an
understanding will help focus the search for the location of the negativity of both the Africa
dummy and TFP.
2.2. Model
As a starting point assume a homogenous Cobb-Douglas technology for the ith African
country to be
where Yi is gross domestic product (GDP), Ni is the population, Ki is the capital stock given by the
perpetual inventory formula as net new investment plus old capital stock less depreciation, i.e., 
(1)
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Zi  is a vector of other output determinants, Ai is the level of technology, and " and $ are constant
parameters to be estimated.
Dividing through by Ni  gives (1) in logarithmic per capita terms as 
where yi  = log (Yi /Ni ), ki = log (Ki /Ni), zi = Zi /Ni , and = log Ai . The estimations of thisai
paper focus on six different versions of (2). Next take a look at some practical issues.
3. Practice 
This section describes measurement issues, estimations, and results.
3.1. Measurement Issues
The dependent variable yi is real per capita GDP in U.S. dollars (US$). Chief among
independent variables is the capital-labour ratio (ki). For the lack of data on capital stock, a
reasonable measure of  ki is the share of GDP that went to capital formation averaged over the
2000-2003 period.
The vector matrix zi includes independent variables such as per capita trade openness
measured as the ratio of per capita exports plus imports to per capita GDP, inflation rate averaged
over the 2000-2003 years (<), and regional dummies (Eastern, Western, Northern, Southern). And
finally is a Hicks-neutral productivity shock - a measure of the technologicala y k zi i i i= − −β γ
basis of performance.
For most countries in this sample the main data source for yi are www.earthtends.wri.org
and  www.finfacts.com. Missing and incomplete data are supplemented by similar data from the
(2)
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International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics - IFS (2005). Inflation rate
(<) also comes from IFS (2005). The data for Openness, Cellfone, and Internet come from
www.Joinafrica.com.
3.2. Estimations
I use the OLS estimator of (2) in five fundamental, and four auxilliary versions. In real per
capita terms all nine versions can be generalized to 
In other words, yi depends on ki, Openness, and an index of macroeconomic environment (Macro)
in Version1. The Macro data comes from World Economic Forum. Missing data for the rest of the
countries in this study is the Africa average Macro (Amacro), calculated as the average sum of
available Macro for n countries, i.e., Version 2 adds  Technologyi,AMacro Macron i= =∑1 178. .
drawn from Global Competitiveness Reports. Where data is missing a proxy was calculated as
where n are countries for which Technologyi dataATechno yi
Techno y
n
NRI
n
i ilog [( ) ( )] . ,log ( )= ∑ − ∑ =−2 2 1 123
is available, and 1-n are countries for which Technologyi data is not available, but a partial data
series, called Networked Readiness Index (NRIi), is available. For comparison purposes the highest
possible score for both Macro and Technologyi is 5.0.
To control for additional variations Version 3 adds regional dummies (Eastern, Western,
Northern,  and Southern). Version 4 assumes that Technologyi can be decomposed into two
measures, viz., Cellfone and Internet. The “Internet” variable is the ratio of internet hosts to internet
users, and “Cellfone” is per capita cell phones. Both measure the intensity of use of new
(3)
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technologies.5  Version 5 includes regional dummies. 
Versions 1-5 constitute the fundamental versions of the basic model in (2) or (3). Auxiliary
Versions 6-9 are not essential estimations;  rather, they are indirect checks on the robustness of  the
fundamental estimations. For example, Version 6 drops Macro, Version 7 drops Openness, Version
8 drops Internet, and Version 9 excludes Cellfone. The next subsection presents and discusses the
results. The discussion stresses Versions 1-5.
3.3 Results
Tables 2 and 3 report estimation results of fundamental and auxiliary versions of (3)
respectively. Excluding the constant term the second column of the first table shows, for example,
that macroeconomic policy has the largest effect on per capita real GDP across these African
countries. Per capita capital and openness to trade are also positively related to per capita real GDP.
More than one third of a percentage point increase in GDP results from a one percentage increase in
ki and Openness. 
A large constant term suggests that some other determinants of real per capita GDP are
missing from Version 1. The regression results in the next column of the table add a measure of
technology using a technology index calculated by the World Economic Forum (2005). In this case
while the coefficients of ki and Openness remain largely unchanged, the estimate of Macro more than
doubles and the constant term falls. A major finding is a huge, negative, and statistically significant
impact of technology on the per capita real GDP of these African countries. This implies that the low
level of technology harms real income determination in these countries. In fact, the magnitude of this
negative coefficient increases significantly when the regression includes regional dummies,
suggesting that the sign is not spurious. Southern Africa has the largest regional dummy and Eastern
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Africa the smallest. Moreover, macroeconomic policy becomes even more important than in
previous versions. Openness to trade remains positive for GDP,  but it is no longer statistically
significant. *PUT TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE*
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 considers explicit components of technology: the intensity of
internet use (Internet) and cell phone use per capita (Cellfone). Parameters for both variables are
large and statistically strong. Such impacts are unaltered by the inclusion of regional dummies,
although in this case trade openness becomes insignificant. Even so, the impact of per capita capital
is robust at about 0.37 across all five fundamental versions. The explanatory power ranges from 21%
to 54%, not unreasonable for cross-section regressions and a relatively small sample.
From Table 2 one also notices that the coefficients of Internet (3.3161) and Cellfone
(5.0941) are large. This raises a question about whether or not these variables are overestimated.
The results in Table 3 indirectly address that concern. Version 6 to Version 9 retain ki and regional
dummy variables as the key independent variables and drop one of the remaining variables from each
regression. Version 6 drops Macro; Version 7 excludes Openness, Version 8 leaves out Internet and
Version 9 goes without Cellfone. The results: compared to Table 2 there is a remarkable
improvement in summary statistics in Table 3; both explanatory and predictive power of the
regressions, for instance, increase. However, there is no major gain in the technical efficiency of
individual parameters. In addition, the values of the log of the likelihood function decline. This seems
to indicate that the fundamental versions in Table 2 are more informative than the auxiliary versions
in Table 3.
Figure 1 summarizes aggregate results, while Figure 2 displays regional variations. One
notices that  per capita income falls within a band bordered by antilog ($6.25 . $518.13) in the south
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and antilog ($8.5 . $4,914.77) in the north. Figure 2a is based on Version 3 and Figure 2b on
Version 5. *PUT TABLE 3 AND FIGURES 3A & 3B AROUND HERE*
 4. Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper is to quantify the impact of technology on per capita real GDP of
some African countries in 2004/2005. The results are encouraging both for policy and further
research. The first estimation begins with per capita capital, trade openness, and macroeconomic
policy index as the main independent variables, assuming homogenous technology across countries.
These results show that 12% of variations in per capita real GDP are explained by those independent
variables. A one percentage rise in capital and trade openness contributes more than a third of one
percentage increase in GDP, and for macro-policy the effect is three-fourths of a percentage change. 
However, the large constant term motivates the inclusion of a country-specific measure of
technology. The negative impact of the technology variable means that technology is a major
constraint of the growth of African countries. This conclusion is consistent with previous
observations of a negative total factor productivity (TFP) and/or Africa dummy.
Since TFP is a catch-all “measure of our ignorance”, subsequent estimations assess the
effects on per capita GDP of the intensity of use of two new technologies: Internet and Cellfone.
Along with the macroeconomic environment these two variables explain real GDP per capita across
countries well. However, as Figure 2 indicates there are considerable regional variations.
A number of implications for research and policy emerge from these conclusions. For
instance, the results suggests a need for improved technology. Increasing the distribution and use of
internet and cell phone technologies is one way of improving technology. These new technologies
have a good chance of rapid diffusion because “social capability” and “technological congruence”
15
already exist in these countries and the cost of initiating them is lower than the cost of adopting old
technologies.
For further research a key implication of the results is a need to investigate the impacts of old
technologies, increasing the sample size, and using alternative modelling and estimations techniques,
and better data. 
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Figure 1 - Average real growth rates across African countries, 1996-2006 (todate), by region
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1996-2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 1996-2006
Year
G
ro
w
th
 
ra
te
, 
%
Central Africa
East Africa
North Africa
Southern Africa
West Africa
All Africa
20
Ta
bl
e 
1 
- A
tti
tu
de
 to
w
a
rd
 
co
n
tin
en
t a
n
d 
ec
on
o
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 in
 m
ill
io
n
s 
o
f G
oo
gl
e 
hi
ts
C
o
n
tin
en
t
C
o
n
tin
en
t a
tt
ra
ct
iv
en
es
s
G
o
o
d 
 
 
 
B
ad
 
 
 
 
G
o
o
d/
B
a
d 
 
 
 
R
a
n
k 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
G
oo
d 
   
Po
o
r 
 
 
 
G
oo
d/
Po
o
r 
 
 
R
an
k
A
fri
ca
 
 
 
 
78
.
9 
 
 
 
20
.
7 
 
 
 
3.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
3.
3 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
43
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
A
sia
 
 
 
 
80
.
3 
 
 
 
22
.
2 
 
 
 
 
3.
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
5.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
Eu
ro
pe
 
 
 
 
16
2.
0 
  5
6.
6 
   
 2
.9
   
   
   
 3
6.
9 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
5 
   
   
 2
.8
   
   
   
   
   
 1
N
o
rt
h 
A
m
er
ica
 
 
 
 
 
 
79
.
9 
 
 
 
27
.
9 
 
 
 
2.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
3.
3 
 
 
 
 
1.
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
So
u
th
 
A
m
er
ica
 
 
 
 
83
.
7 
 
 
 
 
32
.
3 
 
 
 
2.
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
3.
4 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
A
u
st
ra
lia
 
 
 
11
2.
0 
   
43
.8
   
 2
.6
   
   
   
  4
2.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
5 
   
   
 1
.4
   
   
   
   
   
 5
21
b  
() 
ar
e 
T-
ra
tio
s 
at
 
th
e 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
v
el;
 
[] 
ar
e 
de
gr
ee
s 
o
f f
re
ed
om
.
Ta
bl
e 
2 
- D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
o
f p
er
 
ca
pi
ta
 
G
D
P 
a
cr
o
ss
 
A
fr
ic
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
20
04
/2
00
5b
 
 
-
 
Fu
n
da
m
en
ta
l V
er
sio
ns
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
er
sio
n 
1
V
er
sio
n
 
2
V
er
sio
n
 3
V
er
sio
n
 4
V
er
sio
n
 5
Co
n
st
an
t
4.
69
5 
(7.
74
5)
4.
15
3 
(7.
18
9)
N
on
e
5.
13
6 
(8.
29
9)
N
on
e
Lo
g 
ca
pi
ta
l-l
ab
o
u
r 
ra
tio
0.
37
3 
(2.
14
8)
0.
35
7 
(2.
11
6)
0.
35
8 
(2.
38
7)
0.
35
9 
(2.
02
9)
0.
36
8 
(1.
97
9)
Lo
g 
O
pe
nn
es
s
0.
36
5 
(2.
45
1)
0.
36
2 
(2.
51
9)
0.
06
7 
(0.
54
8)
0.
22
3 
(1.
44
2)
0.
09
9 
(0.
70
9)
M
ac
ro
po
lic
y 
(M
ac
ro
)
0.
81
4 
(2.
19
8)
2.
39
6 
(4.
23
1)
4.
06
1 
(5.
51
9)
0.
41
8 
(1.
28
3)
0.
29
2 
(1.
04
0)
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
-
1.
16
9 
(-2
.
68
2)
-
2.
62
1 
(-5
.
03
2)
In
te
n
sit
y 
o
f I
n
te
rn
et
 
5.
41
6 
1.
37
2
4.
82
9 
1.
14
9
In
te
n
sit
y 
o
f C
ell
fo
n
e
3.
75
1 
5.
76
1
3.
31
6 
4.
47
9
Ea
st
er
n
 
re
gi
o
n
3.
73
97
 7
.3
42
5.
09
4 
8.
98
9
W
es
te
rn
 
re
gi
o
n
4.
26
81
 8
.4
97
5.
59
4 
9.
23
3
N
or
th
er
n
 
re
gi
o
n
4.
64
0 
7.
71
0
6.
02
9 
8.
87
2
So
u
th
er
n
 
re
gi
o
n
5.
42
6 
9.
84
3
5.
84
88
 8
.9
04
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
po
w
er
 
(A
dj.
 
R2
)
Jo
in
t h
yp
o
th
es
is 
te
st
 
[F
-
st
at
ist
ic]
G
o
o
dn
es
s-
o
f-f
it 
(P
2  
[d
eg
 fr
ee
do
m
]
Pr
ed
ict
iv
e 
po
w
er
 
(S
EE
/M
ea
n)
D
u
rb
in
-
W
at
so
n
 
{D
}
Lo
g 
lik
eli
ho
o
d 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
(L
LF
)
0.
21
26
91
0.
57
2 
[4
,
42
]
8.
27
30
 [4
]
0.
11
26
1.
90
4 
{0
.01
5}
-
54
.9
72
2
0.
24
81
76
3.
49
4 
[5
,
41
]
1.
46
99
 [3
]
0.
11
00
1.
78
4 
{0
.06
8}
-
53
.3
55
5
0.
54
28
78
8.
38
5 
[8
,
 
38
]
4.
34
29
 [4
]
0.
08
58
 
1.
88
5 
{0
.02
6}
-
40
.1
67
5
0.
43
25
84
5.
30
6 
[6
 
,
40
]
7.
51
5 
[2
]
0.
09
56
2.
45
4 
{-0
.2
29
}
-
46
.3
18
0
0.
49
75
63
7.
35
2 
[9
,
 
37
]
6.
48
0 
[1
]
0.
08
99
2.
36
05
 {-
0.
18
9}
-
41
.7
27
22
Fi
gu
re
 
2 
-
 
Ac
tu
a
l a
n
d 
e
st
im
a
te
d 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
re
a
l G
DP
 
a
cr
o
ss
 
Af
ric
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
(fo
r 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
n
u
m
be
r 
co
de
s 
se
e
 
Ap
pe
n
di
x
 
ta
bl
e
)
5.
56
6.
57
7.
58
8.
59
9.
510
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Co
un
tr
y
Log per capita real GDP, US Dollors
A
ct
u
a
l
V
er
s
ion
1
V
er
s
ion
2
V
er
s
ion
3
V
er
s
ion
4
V
er
s
ion
5
V
er
s
ion
6
V
er
s
ion
7
V
er
s
ion
8
V
er
s
ion
9
23
c  
() 
ar
e 
T-
ra
tio
s 
at
 
th
e 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
v
el;
 
[] 
ar
e 
de
gr
ee
s 
o
f f
re
ed
om
.
Ta
bl
e 
3 
- D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
o
f p
er
 
ca
pi
ta
 
G
D
P 
a
cr
o
ss
 
A
fr
ic
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
20
04
/2
00
5c
 
 
-
 
A
ux
ili
a
ry
 V
er
sio
ns
V
ar
ia
bl
e
V
er
sio
n 
6
V
er
sio
n
 7
V
er
sio
n
 8
V
er
sio
n
 9
Co
n
st
an
t
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Lo
g 
ca
pi
ta
l-l
ab
o
u
r 
ra
tio
0.
40
6 
2.
35
4
0.
40
6 
2.
15
5
0.
39
8 
2.
01
1
0.
34
2 
1.
75
2
Lo
g 
O
pe
nn
es
s
0.
07
6 
0.
53
8
0.
06
7 
0.
46
2
0.
20
7 
1.
47
6
M
ac
ro
po
lic
y 
(M
ac
ro
)
0.
24
6 
0.
86
4
0.
33
7 
1.
20
9
0.
51
2 
1.
66
1
In
te
n
sit
y 
o
f I
n
te
rn
et
 
5.
66
5 
1.
40
9
3.
65
9 
0.
78
5
6.
91
9 
1.
24
6
In
te
n
sit
y 
o
f C
ell
fo
n
e
3.
47
0 
4.
37
8
3.
46
0 
4.
63
1
3.
39
5 
4.
40
8
Ea
st
er
n
 
re
gi
o
n
5.
28
9 
10
.3
55
5.
28
3 
11
.0
42
5.
12
0 
8.
62
7
4.
77
5 
8.
40
1
W
es
te
rn
 
re
gi
o
n
5.
79
6 
10
.0
42
5.
81
7 
12
.3
11
5.
60
4 
8.
94
7
5.
32
7 
9.
29
3
N
or
th
er
n
 
re
gi
o
n
6.
28
2 
9.
12
9
6.
26
4 
9.
85
3
6.
00
6 
8.
09
3
5.
81
8 
8.
10
8
So
u
th
er
n
 
re
gi
o
n
6.
05
2 
9.
78
0
6.
12
6 
11
.6
85
5.
95
6 
8.
62
5
5.
78
0 
8.
19
8
Ex
pl
an
at
o
ry
 
po
w
er
 
(A
dj.
 
R2
)
Jo
in
t h
yp
o
th
es
is 
te
st
 
[F
-
st
at
ist
ic]
G
o
o
dn
es
s-
o
f-f
it 
( P
2  
[d
eg
 fr
ee
do
m
])
Pr
ed
ict
iv
e 
po
w
er
 
(S
EE
/M
ea
n)
D
u
rb
in
-
W
at
so
n
 
{D
}
Lo
g 
lik
eli
ho
o
d 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
(L
LF
)
0.
50
05
72
1.
32
2 
[8
,
38
]
5.
06
1 
[2
]
0.
08
97
2.
47
3 
{-0
.2
49
}
-
42
.1
99
4
0.
50
41
72
6.
46
4 
[8
,
38
]
6.
27
1 
[2
]
0.
08
94
2.
41
31
 {-
0.
22
1}
-
42
.0
37
0
0.
50
17
72
2.
93
7 
[8
,
38
]
3.
00
4 
[2
]
0.
08
95
2.
38
5 
{-0
.2
04
}
-
42
.1
48
3
0.
34
69
55
0.
49
4 
[8
,
 
38
]
3.
89
12
 [2
]
0.
10
25
1.
89
84
 {0
.04
0}
-
48
.3
68
9
24
Fi
gu
re
 
3b
 
-
 
Re
gi
o
n
a
l v
a
ria
tio
n
s:
 
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
 
a
n
d 
G
DP
 
a
cr
o
ss
 
Af
ric
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
(V
e
rs
io
n
 5
)
(fo
r 
co
u
n
tr
y 
n
u
m
be
r 
co
de
s 
se
e
 
a
pp
en
di
x
 
ta
bl
e
)
45678910
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Co
u
n
tr
y
log per cpaita real GDP, US$
A
ct
u
al
 
A
ll
 
Re
gio
na
l
Ea
st
e
rn
 
W
es
te
rn
No
rth
e
rn
So
u
th
er
n
25
Figure 3a - Regional variations: technology and GDP across African countries (Version 3)
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1. Data for this figure comes mainly from Rory J. Clarke’s article available at
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/.  I supplemented these data with other
pieces from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global, http://www.africafocus.org/docs06/econ0601.php,
and http://www.worldfactsandfigures.com/gdp_country_desc.php.
2. The term “ethereal” I learned from Toynbee (1957), Chapters 11 and 12.
3. Both the Africa dummy and Africa TFP are not directly comparable because of different models
and estimators. However, the negative signs of the coefficients have been revealingly consistent.
4. Among few exception Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong and Mark Wilson (2005) dispute the Africa
differentness. 
5.  Land-based telephone, railway, and highway intensities were also considered but these were
multicorrelated with each and correlated with capital-labour ratio.
NOTES
